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The office of justice of the peace is part of the common heritage of
England and the United States of America, and the sexcentenary of
the foundation of the magistracy, celebrated in 1961, is something of a
landmark in both countries. During the 600 years of their existence,
the power and reputation of the justices have fluctuated considerably,
but it would be difficult to over-emphasize their importance in the legal
and constitutional history of England, and therefore, of the United
States.
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There has, however, been a considerable divergence in the develop-
ment of the magistracy in the two countries. It seems clear, at least to
an English observer, that the justices in England have retained far more
of the traditional functions of the office than have their American col-
leagues. The English justice is still an integral part of the judicial system
of England and some of the administrative functions of modern govern-
ment are in fact performed by him. In some respects, indeed, his power
has increased; the scope of summary jurisdiction, for example, has
been consistently widened over the past hundred years. The survival
of the lay magistracy on a large scale is usually a matter of some sur-
prise to foreign observers, and even in England its value is sometimes
questioned. But, although professional magistrates have been appointed
in some of the larger towns, there is no real likelihood of the present
system being replaced. On the contrary, the trend of recent legislation
has been to add to both the judicial and the administrative powers of
these unpaid, part-time judicial officers.
This article will attempt to give a brief account of the history and
present position of the justices in England, and will conclude with a dis-
cussion of some of the practical problems which the system presents
and the criticisms which are made of it.
HISTORY'
Although the sexcentenary has been celebrated on the basis that
the origin of the justices of the peace is to be found in the Justices of
the Peace Act of 1361,2 the gradual development of their office can be
traced back at least to the beginning of the fourteenth century, and
perhaps earlier. Holdsworth mentions an experiment of 1195, when
Richard I's Justiciar, Hubert Walter, issued a proclamation for the
preservation of the peace, by which certain knights were to take an oath
from all men over fifteen years of age that they would aid in the preserva-
tion of the peace.' Certainly, during the thirteenth century, Keepers of
the Peace were appointed during the frequent outbreaks of civil dis-
turbance to aid the Justices of Assize and to perform other duties con-
nected with the preservation of the peace. By the beginning of the
fourteenth century, the office was beginning to assume the form it was
to take under the justices. In 1327, Edward III enacted that Keepers of
the Peace should be appointed in each county,4 and commissions of the
peace issued in 1329, 1332 and 1338, gave authority to hear and deter-
1. See generally ALLEN, THE QUEEN'S PEACE (1953); OSBORNE, JUSTICES OF THE PEACE
1361-1848 (1960); I HOLDSWORTHI, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 285-98, 24-29.
2. 34 Edw. 3, c. 1. The short title was given by the STATUTE LAW REVISION ACT,
1948, § 5, sch. 2. The more descriptive full title, given below, is the original one.
3. I HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 286.
4. I Edw. 3, St. 2, c. 16.
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mine felonies and trespasses.' The first statutory authority to hear
cases of felony was given in an Act of 1344, which provided that:
two or three of the best reputation in the counties shall be as-
signed Keepers of the Peace by the King's Commission; and at
what time shall need be, the same, with other wise and learned
in the law, shall be assigned by the King's Commission to hear
and determine felonies and trespasses done against the peace
in the same counties, and to inflict punishment reasonably ac-
cording to [law and reason and] the manner of the deed.6
The Act of 1361, the full title of which was "What sort of persons shall
be Justices of the Peace; and what authority they shall have," is, how-
ever, notable as being the first official use of the name "Justices of the
Peace." It assigned to every county in England "one lord and with him
three or four of the most worthy in the county with some learned in
the law" to keep the peace, arrest and imprison offenders and hear and
determine felonies and trespasses. Perhaps even more significant as a
landmark is the Act of 13631 which ordered the justices to hold quar-
terly sessions; these, with one short break during the Civil War of 1641-
1648, have continued to the present day.
At first there seems to have been some hesitation on the part of
the central government as to the powers of the justices. In spite of the
Act of 1361, the commissions issued by the King's Council between 1364
and 1368 excluded the power to determine felonies and the administra-
tion of the labor laws (which were of great importance at this period,
because of the acute shortage of manpower created by the Black Death).
But both these powers were restored by another statute in 1368.8 Many
more statutes concerning their powers, numbers and qualifications were
passed during the later Middle Ages and, as the old communal and
feudal institutions died out, the justices tended to take their place in
the administration of the country. At this time, and indeed until the
eighteenth century, there was no distinction drawn between judicial and
administrative functions, and a large share of both was entrusted to the
justices of the peace. By the Tudor period they had become not only an
important part of criminal law enforcement, but also the pivot of local
government.
The focal point of the activities of the justices was Quarter Sessions,
at which most of their business, judicial and administrative, had to be
transacted. Quarter Sessions were, therefore, much more than mere
judicial courts. However, whatever the nature of the business before
the court, judicial forms were used. As one writer has remarked: "The
5. I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 3, at 25.
6. 18 Edw. 3, st. 2, c. 2.
7. 36 Edw. 3, st. 1, c. 12.
8. 42 Edw. 3, c. 6.
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remarkable thing was that so much government could be carried on
through the forms of a criminal trial."' Apart from the justices them-
selves, and the Clerk of the Peace for Quarter Sessions, who was usually
a lawyer, the main participants were the members of the jury. This was
a jury of presentment, the Grand Jury, for, as a statute of 1368 had
provided: "None shall be put to answer without presentment before
justices." 0 Whatever the question before the court, from robbery to the
maintenance of bridges, it was for the jury to say whether offences had
been committed, and to indict those responsible. After the jury had been
summoned, one of the justices gave a general charge to them as to mat-
ters into which they should inquire. The jury heard reports by the con-
stables and others on the state of law and order within the county and,
if there seemed any matter which called for further inquiry, the jury
made their presentments, indictments were drawn up, and the persons
indicted were tried.
However, some of the powers of the justices were exercised out of
sessions, by justices sitting without a jury. The practice of conferring
these powers of summary jurisdiction on one or two justices had already
begun by the end of the sixteenth century. At this period, presentment
was on the whole still necessary, but, for example, by an Act of 1552,
two justices could deal with cases of keeping an alehouse without a
license." The practice grew in the following century. Acts of 1625 and
162712 gave a single justice power to deal summarily with breaches of the
Sunday Observance laws, and the Conventicle Act of 1664, which im-
posed severe penalties on anyone attending a conventicle (defined as a
meeting of more than five persons for worship other than in accordance
with the forms of the Established Church), was remarkable for the
large powers it conferred on justices outside Quarter Sessions. By the
beginning of the eighteenth century, it was fairly common for the
justices to organize periodical meetings for transacting summary business
when more than one justice was required, and, in the second half of the
century, resolutions of the Quarter Sessions of various counties can be
found urging all justices to adopt the practice. These meetings were quite
informal and no record was kept of their proceedings, although, since
convictions other than, those at Quarter Sessions had to be reported to
that court, some idea of their work can be obtained from the records of
Quarter Sessions. They came to be called Petty Sessions, and the term
was increasingly used in nineteenth century legislation concerning the
justices, notably in the Petty Sessions Act of 1849, which recognized them
as courts. But it was not until 1889 that Petty Sessions was statutorily
defined as: "A court of summary jurisdiction consisting of two or more
9. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 140 (1960).
10. 42 Edw. 3, c. 3.
11. 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 25.
12. 1 Car. 1, c. 1; 3 Car. 1, c. 1(2).
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justices sitting in a petty sessional courthouse."'" The distinction between
magistrates sitting in Quarter Sessions and Petty Sessions is a funda-
mental one in the present-day jurisdiction of the justices of the peace.
The first duty of the justices was, of course, to keep the peace and
after 1368 their criminal jurisdiction was, except for treason, unlimited.
In practice, however, the Justices of Assize tended to take over their
highest judicial powers, and there was a clause in the Commission of
the Peace which directed that "difficult" cases were to be reserved for
Assizes. Another limitation was that in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries a practice grew up of reserving capital offenses for the Assizes
and, since the death penalty was imposed for a large number of crimes,
this cut down the criminal jurisdiction of the justices considerably. But
it was not until the nineteenth century that the limits of this jurisdiction
were defined by statute. One of their statutory powers, the power to
"bind over," is one of the curiosities of legal history. The Act of 1361
directed the justices "to take of all them that be of good fame, where
they shall be found, sufficient Surety and Mainprise of their good be-
haviour towards the King and his people, and the other duly to punish."
A century later, a scribe's insertion of a "not" into the Statute empowered
the justices to take surety of good behavior from those who were not of
good fame. At the present day, the power to bind over, for a substantial
sum, to be of good behavior for a certain period, is used mainly as a de-
vice for preventing the repetition of trivial offenses for which only a
small statutory penalty can be imposed, or even to prevent the commis-
sion of acts which are regarded as undesirable but which are not legal
offenses at all.' 4
Not all the functions involved in keeping the peace were judicial;
to some extent the justices of the peace acted as a sort of superior police
force, and amongst the powers conferred on one or two justices acting
"out of Sessions" was the duty of examining into alleged offences. The
justice issued the warrant, examined the accused, and decided whether
to commit him for trial or to discharge him. There were no rules as to
how the examination was to be conducted and no safeguards for the
accused; under this highly arbitrary proceeding the justice was detective,
prosecutor and judge. The system lasted in this form until 1848, when
the preliminary hearing of a criminal charge was statutorily regulated.
The modern preliminary hearing, which is the first stage in the prosecu-
tion of any indictable offense, is a thoroughly judicial proceeding. But
the basic distinction between these two forms of jurisdiction-summary
13. Interpretation Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., c. 63, § 13(12).
14. The legal action taken against supporters of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarma-
ment has in the main been under this heading. Following the "sit-down" demonstrations
in Trafalgar Square and Whitehall, Bertrand Russell and other members of the Campaign
for Nuclear Disarmament were sentenced to short terms of imprisonment for refusing
to be "bound over to be of good behaviour."
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jurisdiction, where the case is actually heard by the magistrates, and the
preliminary hearing of a charge which will be tried by a superior court-
remains.
However, the most remarkable feature of the pre-nineteenth century
Commission of the Peace was the variety and extent of the administra-
tive duties entrusted to it. The Tudor monarchs, especially, seem to
have been anxious to control every detail of their subjects' daily lives,
and the execution of this comprehensive scheme was entrusted to the
justices of the peace.
In the medley of administrative and judicial duties we now
find (to take only a selection) the conservation of highways,
rivers, and fortifications, employment regulations for appren-
tices, servants and labourers, unlawful hunting and games, tip-
pling in alehouses, eating flesh at Lent, tile-making, selling of
horses and harness by soldiers, possession of Papist symbols,
Jesuits and Popish recusants, brawling in church, attendance
at church (compulsory, on pain of a shilling fine), "Egyptians"
or gypsies (a subject of legislation for many centuries), price-
control of candles and earthenware, fuel, malt, corn and other
commodities, plague-infected houses, pheasants and partridges,
spawn of fish, watermen, claims to stolen horses, logwood,
examinations in claims against the hundred for robbery, sedi-
tious meetings, regulations concerning sheriffs and bailiffs
taking plaints in the county court, and, of course, the perennial
rogues, vagabonds and sturdy beggars. 5
This was only a small part of the duties of a justice of the peace,
and the list was always growing.
It would be impossible to discuss this administrative code in any
detail or with any hope of completeness; but, it may be worth while
to take as an example of the difficulties involved, one of the most on-
erous (as it was one of the most long-lasting) of the justices' duties, the
administration of the Poor Law. In 1597, an Act of Elizabeth I imposed
the administration of the Poor Law on the justices of the peace.' 6 The
main principle of the act was that every parish had the responsibility
of caring for its own poor, and, to this end, overseers were to be ap-
pointed in each parish by the justices to see to the levying of a compul-
sory rate. By an amending act of 1601, an appeal from the overseers to
the justices was provided and the whole system was placed under the
justices' absolute control. 7 The theory of the acts, however, was not
borne out by the practice. In many parishes the poor rate was not col-
lected at all; in others, collections were spasmodic and did not produce
15. ALLEN, THE QUEEN'S PEACE 139-40 (1953).
16. 39 Eliz. 1, c. 3.
17. 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2.
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the requisite amount of money. Disputes were constant. The chief prob-
lem, which was to bedevil the Poor Law administration until the late
eighteenth century, was the question of "settlement." Since the parishes
were only bound to provide for their own poor, any potential claimants
for poor relief who did not "belong" to the parish in which they lived
were dispatched back to the parish of their origin. This led to countless
disputes between parishes in various parts of the country as to whose
duty it was to provide for the individual in question, and to a consider-
able traffic in transporting the subject of the dispute from one side of the
country to the other, and frequently, back again. In an attempt to solve
the disputes, the Settlement Act of 1662 formulated rules as to what
was meant by "settlement" in a parish and provided that a newcomer
had to be challenged, if at all, within forty days of his arrival. The only
result of the act was to encourage a new outburst of uprootings and
litigation, which was increased when an act of 1691 abolished the time
limit, so that a newcomer to a parish remained liable to removal for the
rest of his life.' 8 All sorts of devices were used by ingenious parishioners
to establish evidence of "settlement," frequently involving the splitting-
up of husbands, wives and children, forcing apprenticeships and even,
on occasion, marriages.
These were the kind of disputes to which the Justices had to
listen for hours on end-in many of the southern counties in
the later eighteenth century, at least half of the time at Quarter
Sessions was occupied in dealing with cases of disputed "settle-
ment" . . . . In 1813 a Parliamentary return gave the amount
expended by the parishes in connection with poor relief for
the preceding year. Actual relief cost £6,656,000. In addition
there was an item in respect of removals and law charges.
The figure was £324,957. Not one penny of this huge sum had
been spent on the purpose for which it was raised. Far from
relieving the poor it had only added to their misery and dis-
tress. 9
The problem was only really dealt with when the Royal Commission on
the Poor Law in 1834 condemned the whole existing system of poor
relief and recommended the setting up of a central body, the Commis-
sioners for Poor Law, to unify and supervise local administration.
The recommendations were enacted by the Poor Law Act of 1834,
and the administration of poor relief was taken almost entirely out of
the justices' hands. The Poor Law Act is something of a landmark for
the justices of the peace, for it marks the beginning of the turn of the
tide in local government by the magistracy. Many important adminis-
trative duties still remained, but during the course of the nineteenth
18. OSBORNE, JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 1361-1848 129-31, 186-91 (1960).
19. Id. at 190.
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century the justices were gradually relieved of most of them. The pro-
cess was really completed by the Local Government Act of 1888, which
set up local government councils and transferred to them most of the
remaining administrative powers of the justices. The administrative
functions of the modern justice, which will be discussed below, are of
relatively minor importance.
A similar story of comparative failure could be told about the his-
tory of most of the administrative functions imposed on the justices, and
to a large extent, the failure was probably due to the inadequacy of the
number and quality of officials available. Apart from a few officials,
specially appointed for specific purposes, like the Overseers of the Poor
Law and the Clerk of the Peace who advised at Quarter Sessions, the
only officer available to the justices was the Petty Constable of the
parish. The Petty Constable, who is not to be confused with a much
later creation, the modern police constable, was simply a parishioner
elected by his neighbors to serve for one year. His duties are difficult to
list, for he was the guardian of the law within his area and all com-
plaints, of whatever kind, came in the first instance to him for appro-
priate action. Many criminal matters, including the pursuing and cus-
tody of offenders, were his responsibility, and he was the servant of
the justices in the enforcement of a host of minor regulations. He was
also responsible for delivering a report on the state of the law and the
administration within his area to Quarter Sessions. In theory the office
rotated, but in practice, since the duties were onerous, it became fairly
common for the wealthier inhabitants of a neighborhood to avoid their
turn. Indeed, one of the rewards for securing a conviction for felony in
the eighteenth century was the so-called "Tyburn ticket," a certificate
from Quarter Sessions exempting the holder from any kind of parish
office for life.20 As a result, even in the sixteenth century, the Petty Con-
stable had become notorious for neglecting his duties. In fact, they
were too numerous for one man to accomplish, and when the one man
was likely to be a person of little or no education, it is hardly surprising
that he seems, in many cases, to have abandoned even the attempt to
perform them. The position varied, of course, from parish to parish, but
in general it may be said that the administrative machinery by which
the justices were expected to govern the country was so deficient as to
be almost non-existent.
In view of the handicaps under which they worked, the government
of England by unpaid, untrained, part-time officials was an extraor-
dinary achievement; for, in spite of the eventual collapse of most of the
administrative schemes with which they were burdened, it was on the
whole a remarkably successful government. There were, of course, black
20. OSBORNE, op. cit. supra note 18, at 177. Tyburn was the place of public execu-
tion. At that time it was on the outskirts of London.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
patches. The "trading justices" of eighteenth century London were no-
torious for their corruption and for the large fortunes they acquired by
bribes and extortion.21 Many of the county justices must have been
rather casual about their duties and some seem never to have appeared
at Quarter Sessions at all. But in spite of these lapses, there were
enough conscientious justices at work to maintain the high reputation
of the body as a whole. The justices were, of course, at nearly all times,
members of "the gentry," but they were gentry who felt the responsi-
bilities of their position and who were respected and relied on by their
poorer neighbors, to whom they were the embodiment of "the law." As
Maitland remarked: "The most learned 'barrister of seven years'
standing' will find it hard to get so high a reputation among country
folk for speaking with the voice of the law, as that which has been en-
joyed by many a country squire whose only juristic attainment was the
possession of a clerk who could find the appropriate page in Burn's
Justice.1 22 It seems a pity, therefore, that their efforts were not more
appreciated by the governments they sought to serve.
A few compliments from authority can be found, but on the whole,
the communications of the central government to the justices of the
peace seem to have consisted largely of unrestrained abuse. This is par-
ticularly so in the Tudor period when the Privy Council, while constantly
increasing the burden of duties on the justices, was also constantly and
rather inconsistently complaining of their inadequate performance of
the duties they already had. A statute of Henry VII, in 1489, contained
a proclamation listing the failings of the justices and threatening them
with expulsion from the Commission, which was ordered to be read out
at each meeting of Quarter Sessions in the presence of the justices.2 8 The
reign of Elizabeth I is full of exhortations to the justices, and at one
time she seems even to have been considering abolishing the institu-
tion.24 In the following reign, Francis Bacon referred, in a report to
James I, to "the distracted government of Justices of the Peace. 25 The
volume of official complaint seems to have decreased during the seven-
teenth century, but this may be because, after the Restoration of the
Monarchy in 1660, the central government gradually ceased to exercise
any supervision over the activities of the justices. The eighteenth cen-
tury justice was, apart from the control exercised by the higher courts
by means of prerogative writs, very much of a law unto himself.
21. See generally the novels of Henry Fielding, himself a magistrate of great dis-
tinction.
22. Maitland, THE SHALLOWS AND SILENCES OF REAL LI'E, in I COLLECTED PAPERS 467,
477. This short article, written in 1888 in anticipation of the Local Government Act, is
something of an obituary for the traditional justice of the peace.
23. 4 Hen. 7, c. 12.
24. OSBORNE, op. cit. supra note 18, at ch. 5.
25. S. & B. WEBB, ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT; ENGLISH POOR LAW HISTORY: PART
1, THE OLD POOR LAW 94.
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Some reform of the heterogeneous authority exercised by the jus-
tices was, however, inevitable, and it came in the great age of reform,
the first half of the nineteenth century. A beginning was made on the
state of the criminal law, and in 182720 a large number of enactments
dating from the sixteenth century and earlier were repealed. But direct
action started in 1848, when four bills relating to the work of the
justices were introduced into the House of Commons. Two of these, the
Summary Jurisdiction Act of 1848, and the Indictable Offenses Act of
1848, are the foundation of all the modern law relating to the justices
of the peace. By far the largest of these enactments was the Summary
Jurisdiction Act, which provided "a veritable charter of the law govern-
ing the judicial activities of justices outside of Quarter Sessions. It set
out in clear and unambiguous language to consolidate, clarify and re-
concile, the hopeless tangle of earlier legislation. Its passage gave a new
significance and importance to summary jurisdiction."27 The consolida-
tion and clarification of the existing criminal jurisdiction of the justices
was in itself an important enough achievement, but probably the chief
significance of the act from the point of view of the present day is that
it laid down, for the first time in their history, a code of criminal pro-
cedure to be followed by the justices. Not the least important provision
was section 12: "The room or place in which the justices shall sit to hear
any complaint or information shall be deemed an open and public place
to which the public generally may have access." Much more legislation
on summary jurisdiction followed during the course of the nineteenth
century, some of which will be mentioned below, but the great im-
portance of the act of 1848 was that it provided the preliminary work
without which none of these improvements and refinements would have
been possible. Indirectly, it also paved the way for the enormous ex-
pansion of summary jurisdiction during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries which has resulted in the magistrates hearing and disposing of
an overwhelming majority of present-day prosecutions in England. Al-
most as important is the other great statute of 1848, the Indictable
Offenses Act, which dealt with the preliminary examination by the jus-
tices of all persons accused of indictable offenses. We have seen how, in
earlier times, this was a very haphazard and often ruthless proceeding,
which under the act was replaced by a purely judicial procedure. All the
sworn testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution had to be taken
down in writing, the accused was permitted to question the witnesses
and, on this basis, the justices decided whether a prima facie case had
been made out and whether the accused should be committed for trial
at Quarter Sessions or Assizes. The accused was not at this time allowed
to give evidence on his own behalf, either in these proceedings or at the
trial. This hearing, being no more than a preliminary examination, did
26. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 27.
27. OSBORNE, op. cit. supra note 18, at 225-26.
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not have to be in public. The act has been amended, notably by the
Criminal Justice Act of 1925, and its working has been affected by more
general reforms in criminal procedure, of which perhaps the most im-
portant is the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898,28 which permitted an ac-
cused to give sworn testimony on his own behalf. But it is on the basis
of the act of 1848 that, with very few exceptions, all criminal cases in
this country come, in the first instance, before the justices of the peace.
A few other important reforming statutes may be mentioned. The
Justices Protection Act of 1848 extended a qualified judicial immunity
to the justices by providing that no action would lie against them for
anything done within their jurisdiction unless malice could be proved.20
The Petty Sessions Act of 1849 regulated the holding of these courts.
The Summary Jurisdiction Act of 1857 provided for appeals to the High
Court on points of law. Of the other statutes on summary jurisdiction,
the most important is the act of 1879,80 by which, when an accused per-
son was liable, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for more than
three months, he could demand trial by jury. It also provided that when
a child under the age of twelve was charged with any indictable offense
other than homicide, the justices could, with the consent of the parent
or guardian, try the case summarily. The same principle was applied to
certain offenses against property committed by persons between the ages
of twelve and sixteen, provided that the accused consented to summary
trial. When the same type of offense was committed by persons over the
age of sixteen, and the property did not exceed forty shillings in value,
the justices could also, with the consent of the accused, deal with it
summarily. These provisions are of great importance in two respects-in
introducing the special treatment of juveniles and in beginning the ex-
tension of summary jurisdiction. The latter principle came into its own
in the Criminal Justice Act of 1925, by which a large number of offenses,
which were previously only triable by judge and jury, were, at the dis-
cretion of the justices and with the consent of the accused, made triable
summarily. 1 The punishments which can be imposed by the justices are
strictly limited by the act, and a vast majority of accused persons do
in fact choose to have their cases disposed of in this way. Two recent
statutes may be mentioned. As a result of the Royal Commission on the
Justices of the Peace of 1948,2 the Justices of the Peace Act of 1949,
was passed. This act deals mainly with finance and administration, and
its provisions will be discussed later. Finally, there is the great modern
consolidating statute, the Magistrates' Courts Act of 1952, which re-
28. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36, § 1.
29. The extent of the immunity conferred is a subject of dispute. See VII (C) of
this article's text infra.
30. Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, 42 & 43 Vict., c. 49, §§ 10-12, 17. See IV(A) of
this article's text infra.
31. Criminal Justice Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86, sch. 2, § 24.
32. Cmd. 7463.
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peals and re-enacts most of the summary jurisdiction acts and under
which most of the modern powers of the justices of the peace are exer-
cised.
II. APPOINTMENT, QUALIFICATIONS AND RETIREMENT
The number of justices of the peace in a given area and the quali-
fications required for the office have varied during the course of their
history, but the actual appointment has, with one exception, always been
by the Crown. In 1327"8 the King assumed the right to appoint all'
keepers of the peace. The privilege was restated in an act of 1344, 4 and
the Jurisdiction in Liberties Act of 1535 provided that no person should
have authority to make justices, but all such officers should be appointed
by letters patent under the Great Seal and by the authority of the King
and his heirs. During the Interregnum of 1649-1660, commissions were
issued solely on the authority of Parliament and in the name of "The
Keepers of the Liberty of England" or, after 1655, "Oliver Cromwell,
Lord Protector." The authority of the justices originally depended on
the terms of this "Commission of the Peace," but as medieval statutes
added to their duties, the Commission became exceedingly long and con-
fused. Lambard, in 1581, wrote: "By the number of statutes in charge
of Justices, and by much vain repetition and other corruption, and by
the huddling of things together, it has become so foully blemished, that
of necessity it ought to be redressed." Thereafter, in 1590, Sir Christo-
pher Wray, Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench, in conference with the
other judges, issued a revised commission, the terms of which are sub-
stantially the same as the modern one. The second clause of this com-
mission, which deals with the institution of the Quorum, is not without
interest. After appointing the justices, it provided that at least two
justices must be present at a hearing, of whom (quorum) one should
be chosen from a list of persons named in the commission. The in-
tention was that only those justices who were learned in the law should
sit, but from the late sixteenth century onwards, membership of the
Quorum became a political favor, and eventually, all justices were made
members. The distinction, which by that time had become meaningless,
was abolished by an act of 1753.11 Such legal knowledge as was needed
was supplied by the clerk and in any case, what the justices increasingly
required was a compendium of information about their mass of statutory
duties. This could only be supplied by the bulky manuals on the sub-
ject which have been part of English legal literature since the sixteenth
century.
Although by law, the appointment was in the hands of the Crown,
33. 1 Edw. 3, st. 2, c. 16.
34. 18 Edw. 3, st. 2, c. 2.
35. 26 Geo. 2, c. 27.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
in practice, it had to be exercised on the advice of some person or body.
The qualifications required showed the sort of persons who were to be
considered. By a statute of 138936 they were to be the most sufficient
knights, esquires and gentlemen of the land, and, by a statute of 1414,"7
to be resident in their counties. A further act of 143938 required them to
have land valued at twenty pounds a year. In other words, they were to
be "the gentry." In the Middle Ages, strenuous efforts were made by
Parliament to get the names proposed submitted for Parliamentary ap-
proval, but the attempt failed, and in Tudor times and up to the time of
the civil war, the appointments were made by the Privy Council, ad-
vised by the Assize judges. During the civil war, the function was per-
formed by Parliament, who naturally preferred men of their own per-
suasions, so that for the first time merchants, attorneys and tradesmen
appeared on the commission. But with the Restoration of the Monarchy,
a wholesale reorganization brought back all the excluded gentry. During
the reigns of Charles II and James II, there was a certain amount of
manipulation of the commission for court purposes, usually in an at-
tempt to get justices favorable to the Crown's policy of religious tolera-
tion. When James II was deposed, there was another purge designed to
rid the commission of any traces of Jacobitism. After this period,
however, direct interference by the central government seems to have
stopped, and nominations for each county fell into the hands of the Lord
Lieutenant of the county, who held the honorary position of Custos
Rotulorum, head of the Commission of the Peace. This, together with
the raising of the property qualification from twenty to one hundred
pounds a year in 1732,"9 ensured that the justices were "men of sub-
stance," forming something of a "ruling class."
It was because of the extensive influence of the Lords Lieutenant
and of their practice of advising the appointment of people of their
political persuasion, that the report of the Royal Commission on the
Selection of Justices of the Peace in 1910 recommended the setting up
of the Advisory Committees. Justices are still appointed nominally by
the Crown, but in practice appointment is by the Lord Chancellor (or
in Lancashire, by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster), and the
Lord Chancellor acts on the advice of advisory committees which he
creates for each county or borough having a separate Commission of
the Peace. The composition of the advisory committees is now secret,
but it is permissible to make public the name of the Secretary of the
Committee, and anybody can suggest to him names for consideration.
In the counties, the Chairman of the Committee is always the Lord
Lieutenant of the county. Appointments had been almost exclusively
36. 13 Rich. 2, st. 1, c. 7.
37. 2 Hen. 5, st. 1, c. 4.
38. 18 Hen. 6, c. 11.
39. 5 Geo. 2, c. 18.
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conservative in political outlook but although criticism on these grounds
is still heard, there is no doubt that matters are much improved. In-
evitably, people who are active in local politics are likely to be con-
sidered for appointment. Among these people it is important to main-
tain a balance, and equally important to ensure that leading citizens
without political association should be included.4 °
Justices are entitled to receive payment of travelling expenses in-
curred in attending court,4 ' but there is no provision for payment for
loss of earnings nor for service. Originally, justices were paid four
shillings a day during Quarter Sessions, "that pay being about sixteen
times the wage of a day labourer, but the decline in the value of money
led to the office becoming unpaid; by the end of the seventeenth century
the remuneration merely provided a free dinner for the bench, and today
their services are entirely gratuitous."42 Here, then, are the real victims
of inflation. There is an obvious danger that only the more affluent
members of society can allow themselves to be considered, but it does
not appear in practice that this has been a serious problem.4"
Property qualifications for Justices were abolished by the Justices
of the Peace Act of 1906, and the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act
of 1919, allowed women to be appointed. Justices must reside within
fifteen miles of their area of jurisdiction.4"
A justice is appointed for life. The Lord Chancellor has long had
power to remove a justice for good cause, but this power was for various
reasons rarely used. It did not in any case meet the real problem, which
was that of justices continuing to sit after they had become too old or
incapable to be useful. Until recent years it was common to joke about
the age and infirmity of the bench, and the position was all the more
serious in that the justice in question was likely, by reason of his sen-
iority, to be Chairman.
Section 4 of the Justice of the Peace Act of 1949 provides for the
creation of a supplemental list on which are to be placed the names of
all justices who reach the age of seventy-five or who apply to be trans-
ferred to it. Justices on the supplemental list may only perform certain
very limited functions which do not include sitting in court.
40. Cf. Report of the Royal Commission on the Justices of the Peace (1948), Cmd.
7463.
41. Justices of the Peace Act, 1949, 12-14 Geo. 6, c. 101, § 8.
42. JACKSON, MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 149 (3d ed. 1960).
43. Some persons are justices, ex officio. These include some high officers of state,
High Court and County Court judges, some ecclesiastical and university dignitaries, some
lawyers engaged in the work of justices and mayors of boroughs, and chairmen of county
councils, urban district councils and rural district councils. Id. at 90.
44. Justices of the Peace Act, 1949, 12-14 Geo. 6, c. 101, § 1(1).
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III. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COURTS
A. The Composition of the Courts
An account of the work of the present-day justice of the peace in-
volves the consideration of two courts-Petty Sessions or, as they are
also called, Magistrates' Courts, and Quarter Sessions. There are over
1,000 Magistrates' Courts spread across England and Wales, and most
of them are staffed by lay justices. Each county has its own Commission
of the Peace, headed by the Lord Lieutenant. The counties are divided
up into Petty Sessional Districts, each of which has one or more courts
sitting in the area. Boroughs45 frequently have their own justices and,
if this is the case, the borough forms a division of its own. Some of the
larger boroughs employ legally qualified stipendiary magistrates who
may, but need not, sit alone. In the city of London, the court consists
of the Lord Mayor and Aldermen, any one of whom may sit alone. The
number of magistrates who can compose a court is governed by rules
made by the Lord Chancellor under section 13 of the Justices of the
Peace Act of 1949.46 Normally, the minimum is two, 47 and the maximum
in Petty Sessions is now seven. The odd number is obviously advan-
tageous and a relatively small bench is desirable. The usual bench con-
sists of three or five justices; three is more convenient for purposes of
consultation. The number of sittings varies in different parts of the
country. In the more remote areas the court may sit only once a month,
while in large towns there will be several courts sitting simultaneously
every day.
Quarter Sessions, as we have seen, are organized on a county and
borough basis and traditionally meet four times a year. This frequency
is now the minimum, and Quarter Sessions will sit as often as is neces-
sary to deal with business.4" Until fairly recently, Quarter Sessions in
counties consisted of all the justices of the county sitting together, which,
in theory, would have meant a court of several hundred judges, and it
was not unusual to find twenty or more justices on the bench. A court
of this size is obviously inconvenient, and the situation has been regu-
lated by statute. 9 In the counties, the justices normally sit and take
part in the decision of the case, presided over by a legally qualified
chairman. 0 For these purposes, the maximum number of justices who
45. A borough is a town which has been incorporated by royal charter. Its powers
are governed by the Local Government Act, 1933. Between 400 and 500 of the largest
towns are so incorporated.
46. Justices of the Peace (Size and Chairmanship of Bench) Rules, 1950. (S.I. 1950
No. 1908) and Amendment Rules, 1951 (S.I. 1951 No. 1982).
47. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6, 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 98. But a single
magistrate can try an offense for which the maximum penalty does not exceed twenty
shillings or imprisonment not exceeding fourteen days.
48. Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1962, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, c. 15, § 4.
49. Justices of the Peace Act, 1949, 12-14 Geo. 6, c. 101, § 13, and rules made
thereunder. See note 46 supra.
50. "Legally qualified chairman": Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Pro-
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can sit with the Chairman is eight, but usually, and preferably, the
number is four or six. Those individual justices who have previously sat
on the case-whether at the preliminary hearing before committal or
in the decision of a case which comes to Quarter Sessions on appeal-
will not sit. Many boroughs have their own courts of Quarter Sessions in
which the sole judge is the Recorder, who must be a barrister of five
years' standing,5 and who is appointed by the Crown and receives a
salary. As a courtesy, lay justices can sit with him on the bench during
the session, but they take no part in the case.
The Magistrates' Courts are at the bottom of the judicial hierarchy,
but in number and in the amount of business transacted, they are by
far the most important of English courts. In what follows, therefore,
we shall be concerned mainly with the work of the justices in Petty
Sessions.
B. Internal Organization
A Bench must elect its Chairman annually by secret ballot and
without nominations, the prohibition against nominations being intended
to avoid different groups "running" a candidate. Until 1949, there was
no Chairman, but the Mayor was entitled to preside at any meeting of
justices. This was unsatisfactory because the Mayor may have no
knowledge or experience of a Magistrates' Court.52 Deputy Chairmen
are also elected with a view to providing someone who could take the
chair on days on which the Chairman is not present, and also to provide
a person who will preside in each court on days on which more than one
court is sitting. The details of these arrangements vary with the situa-
tion of the particular bench.
The justices also appoint certain committees. The Justices of the
Peace Act of 1949,58 requires the appointment of Magistrates' Courts
Committees, on the scale of one for each county and one for each
county borough with a population of 60,000 or more. In a county, each
sessional division within the county appoints one member of the com-
mittee. The Magistrates' Courts Committee is charged with various
miscellaneous duties, and particularly, with the appointment and re-
moval of Justices' Clerks, 4 the division of counties into petty sessional
divisions, and the provision of courses of instruction for justices.)5 An
visions) Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 63, § 2, as amended by the Criminal Justice Ad-
ministration Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 34, § 12, sch. 3. The chairman may sometimes
sit alone, Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1962, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, c. 15, § 4(5).
51. Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict., c. 50, § 163(1).
52. He is still, ex officio, a magistrate. Justices of the Peace Act, 1949, 12-14 Geo. 6,
c. 101, § 2.
53. Justices of the Peace Act, 1949, 12-14 Geo. 6, c. 10i, § 16.
54. See III(D) of this article's text infra.
55 Each Magistrates' Courts Committee is obligated by the Lord Chancellor to
provide courses of instruction. All new magistrates are expected to attend, and others may.
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important question in this context is whether petty sessional divisions
should be organized in such a way that the county can be served by a
full time clerk with a permanent staff rather than allowing a number of
divisions each to have a part time clerk, who will probably be a practis-
ing solicitor as well. Opinions are divided on the matter. 6
The Magistrates' Courts Committee is also concerned with the fin-
ancing of courts of summary jurisdiction. The duty of providing the
petty sessional court-house and other accommodations, furniture and
books for the justices and their clerks, the salary of the clerks and staff
employed by them, and the expenses of the Magistrates' Courts Com-
mittees, rests on the appropriate county or borough council having a
separate Commission of the Peace. 7 The councils are, subject to a few
qualifications, reimbursed out of the fines and fees received by the
courts. 8 The amount to be expended by local councils for these pur-
poses is determined by the Magistrates' Courts Committees, after con-
sultation with the council concerned. 9
Other statutory committees which are appointed are the Licensing
Committee, the Betting Licensing Committee, the Juvenile Court Panel
and the Probation Case Committee.6"
C. Procedure and Practice
The procedure in court varies from that of other English criminal
courts in so far as summary trial is necessarily different from trial by
jury. The observance of procedure is no doubt less formal for, in a large
majority of the cases, neither the parties nor the justices will be pro-
fessionally trained. As explained below, many defendants are tried in
their absence6 and most of those who do appear are not represented.
Those who do obtain professional assistance may be represented by a
barrister or solicitor, and may, on occasion, be given the representation
free of charge. Too often, however, the magistrates have to ascertain
the defendant's side of the story from his own incoherent statements,
and sometimes, from inarticulate comment or from silence. It is of great
importance not only to ascertain the defendant's story, but also to give
him and the public the impression that every care has been taken.
Magistrates can do this by patient listening or by careful questioning.
When the evidence and the arguments of both sides have been
56. JACKSON, MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 156-57 (3d ed. 1960). Report on
the replacement of part-time by full-time clerks to justices, undertaken for the Central
Council Magistrates' Courts Comittees, by the Justices' Clerks' Society, Dec. 13, 1956.
57. Justices of the Peace Act, 1949, 12-14 Geo. 6, c. 101, § 25.
58. Justices of the Peace Act, 1949, 12-14 Geo. 6, c. 101 § 27.
59. Justices of the Peace Act, 1949, 12-14 Geo. 6, c. 101, § 26. There is an appeal
from the decision of the Magistrates' Courts Committee to the Secretary of State: § 26(3).
60. The Probation Case Committee meets quarterly and reviews the cases of all the
probationers in the area of its jurisdiction. See IV(C) and IV(D) of this article's text infra.
61. See V(A) of this article's text infra.
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completed, the magistrates must both find the facts and decide the case.
Discussion of a case can take place in court, but if the matter involves
any difficulty, the justices usually retire to their private room, where
they reach a conclusion on the case. In the event of a decision to con-
vict, the justices will form a provisional view as to the penalty which
should be imposed. This will of course be dependent upon the previous
record of the offender, which will not be known until the justices an-
nounce their decision on the question of guilt. Consideration of the
penalty may necessitate a further retirement.
D. The Clerk62
Since the justices are untrained in the law, it is necessary to arrange
to have competent legal advice available for them. The Clerk to the
justices prepares the papers, arranges the dates for trial, sits in court
below the bench, and is responsible for advising the justices on pro-
cedure and the law. He is the key figure in a Magistrate's Court. He
can exercise a great influence by ensuring that the justices have all the
information which is necessary to enable them to come to a decision, but
he must not make their decision for them. He will often have to foresee
occasions on which witnesses are about to give inadmissible evidence. He
will sometimes question witnesses to clarify points of fact if they have
not been elucidated by the evidence or by questions from the bench. He
must answer the justices' questions as to the law and should call their
attention to legal points overlooked. He needs to be alert and learned,
and endlessly patient and tactful.
When questions arise on points about which he is asked advice or
about which he thinks his advice should be offered to the justices, he
may give it to them from his place in court. When the justices retire to
a separate room to consider a case after the argument is concluded,
there is some doubt as to the extent to which a clerk should advise them
in private. If he retires with them, the parties may feel that he may say
things which will, in effect, decide the case for the justices. On the other
hand, the justices can properly require the benefit of his advice during
their deliberations. This situation can give rise to very difficult theoreti-
cal questions. In fact, however, they rarely arise because of the trust
which is placed in the bona fides of the clerks and the justices.
The present practice is based on a direction given by Lord God-
dard, L.C.J.:
As for the manner in which the justices might consult their
clerk, the Court, his Lordship thought, had made it clear in
the East Kerrier case that the decision of the Court must
be the decision of the justices, and not that of the justices and
62. See Report of the Committee on Justices' Clerks, 1944, Cmd. 6507.
63. Regina v. East Kerrier Justices, [1952] 2 Q.B. 719.
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their clerk, and that if the clerk retired with the justices as a
matter of course it was inevitable that the impression would
be given that he might influence the justices as to the decision
or sentence or both. A clerk should not retire with his justices
as a matter of course, nor should they attempt to get round the
decisions to which his Lordship had referred merely by asking
him in every case to retire with them, or by pretending that
they required his advice on a point of law.
Subject to that it was in the discretion of the justices to ask
their clerk to retire with them if in any particular case it had
become clear that they would need his advice. If in the course
of their deliberations they found that they needed him, they
could send for him. On that matter his Lordship would em-
phasize one further point-that if the clerk did retire with the
justices, or was sent for by them, he should return to his place
in court as soon as he was released by the justices, leaving
them to complete their deliberations in his absence, and come
back into court in their turn.64
E. The Police as Prosecutors
In Magistrates' Courts the prosecution is usually undertaken by
the police, and the case is handled by the police officer in whose name
the information was laid. A solicitor or barrister may be employed by
the police where a case involves legal difficulties or where the individual
prosecutor is for some reason not available. However, a solicitor or
barrister must be employed to conduct committal proceedings.
While this practice is economical and has obvious administrative
conveniences it has been criticized on the ground that it is improper for
the police to be the detectives, the custodian of the accused (in cases of
arrest), and also the prosecutor in court. There is also said to be a
danger of creating an unfair position for junior police officers when in
the witness box, as they may be influenced to give the answer required
by a senior officer who is conducting the prosecution. A harsh cross-
examination of an accused by a police officer may give the impression
of bullying and of the desire of the police to obtain a conviction at any
cost. There is also the danger that the justices hearing the same police
prosecutor at successive sittings may be thought to feel an association
with him and not be able to maintain the necessary impartiality.
The Royal Commission on the Police recommended that the whole
matter be reviewed, and stated that they thought that it was undesirable
that police officers should appear as prosecutors except for minor cases.
"Anything which tends to suggest to the public mind the suspicion of
64. Statement by Lord Goddard, L.C.J., in the High Court: The Times, Nov. 17,
1953. See also Regina v. East Kerrier Justices, [19521 2 Q.B. 719, Regina v. Stafford
Justices, [1962] 1 WEEKLY L.R. 456.
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alliance between the court and the police cannot but be prejudicial."6
It is most important that the justices and the police should be aware of




There is a basic division in England between indictable and sum-
mary offenses. There is no constitutional right to trial by jury, and
summary trial means a trial before justices who decide questions both
of law and fact. Trial on indictment means trial upon an indictment
which is drawn up after a preliminary inquiry by the justices, or after
a coroner's inquisition, and always involves trial by jury. Statutory
authority is needed to enable an offense to be tried summarily; this may
be given by a general enactment 6 or by specific provision in the statute
creating the offense. There are five categories:67
(1) The most serious offenses are triable on indictment only.
Homicide, arson, rape, causing grievous bodily harm with intent, burg-
lary, and breaking and entering dwelling houses, are examples of of-
fenses wich are included in this category.
(2) Less serious indictable offenses may be tried summarily,
subject always to the consent of the accused, who must be informed of
his right of choice. Typical examples of this group are warehouse
breaking, stealing, and various forms of fraud. The court must be satis-
fied that the case is a suitable one for summary trial, taking into con-
sideration the nature of the case, the appropriateness of the punishment
they can inflict, and any representation made by the prosecutor or the
accused. 8 Another factor which could be relevant is the previous record
of the accused, but this will not be available to the justices at the time
when they make the decision whether to hear the case or not. Provision
is presently made for the justices, after a finding of guilt, to commit the
accused to Quarter Sessions for punishment if his character and record
is such that they feel that their own powers of punishment are in-
adequate.6 9 The Criminal Justice Administration Act of 1962, has
removed another difficulty which could arise by providing that if the
justices begin the summary trial of an offense and then find that the
case is a more serious one than they had thought, they can discontinue
65. Report of the Royal Commission on the Police (1962) Cmd. 1728 II 381.
66. Magistrates' Courts Acts, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 19, sch. 1.
67. JACKSON, MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 93 (3d ed. 1960). Magistrates'
Courts Act, 1952, sch. 1; Criminal Justice Administration Act, 1962, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, c.
15, § 1, sch. 3.
68. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 19.
69. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 29.
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the summary proceedings and start on a preliminary examination with
a view to committal for trial.
70
(3) Some offenses are stated in the statute creating them to be
triable both summarily and on indictment.71 Such offenses will be
tried on indictment unless, on the application of the prosecution, the
court decides to try the case summarily. But if the justices decide
to do so, or if they decide to inquire into it as examining justices with
a view to subsequent trial on indictment, they may change their de-
cision if the nature of the case shows that the alternative procedure
would be more appropriate. 72 If the offense, when tried summarily, as
in the case of a charge of dangerous driving, carries a maximum punish-
ment of more than three months imprisonment, the accused has the right
to trial by jury on indictment, and must be so informed.
(4) Whenever a summary offense carries a maximum punishment
greater than three months imprisonment, the accused has a right to be
tried by jury on indictment, and he must be informed of this right.
73
(5) Other offenses are triable summarily only. A person con-
victed has a right to appeal from conviction or sentence to Quarter
Sessions, but this appeal, whatever the grounds, is heard without a
jury.
74
B. Committal for Trial
Although justices only try cases summarily, it is part of their duty
to hold a preliminary inquiry into charges which will not be so tried.
75
In this connection, the justices must decide whether there is sufficient
evidence to put the accused on trial by jury, and after hearing the evi-
dence, they will either commit him for trial or discharge him. During
the inquiry the accused may cross-examine prosecution witnesses, pro-
duce witnesses of his own, and make a statement. It is usual, however,
for him to say little or nothing at this stage. The justices in this inquiry
are not trying the case; they are doing no more than deciding whether
there is evidence on which the accused ought to stand trial, and it is
rare that the prosecution will proceed with a case without this evidence.
70. 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, c. 15, § 13.
71. E.g., Road Traffic Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 16, pt. I, § 2: A person who
drives a motor vehicle on a road recklessly, or at a speed or in a manner which
is dangerous to the public . . . shall be liable (a) on conviction on indictment,
to a fine or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to both a
fine and such imprisonment; (b) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding
one hundred pounds or to imprisonment not exceeding four months or to both
such fine and such imprisonment . ..
72. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 18. In some
circumstances the accused may be committed to Quarter Sessions for sentence. Magistrates'
Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55 §§ 25(5), 29.
73. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6, 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 25. Some ex-
ceptions are mentioned in § 25(1).
74. The prosecution may appeal if a summary charge is dismissed.
75. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6, 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, §§ 4-12.
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As a matter of tactics, it is usually inadvisable for the accused to dis-
close the substance of his defense at this stage. He will do better to
reserve it for the jury, for, while the prosecution's case must be known
to the accused, he is not obliged to disclose his defense, and may there-
fore take the prosecution by surprise at the trial.
This proceeding takes the place of the Grand Jury. Some proceed-
ing of this nature is necessary; however, it is time-consuming and
tedious, and may bring distasteful publicity to the case before trial. The
procedure is that all the witnesses give their evidence and this evidence
is taken down on a typewriter by the clerk.7 6 The evidence of each wit-
ness is then read over to him and signed before he is bound over to attend
the trial. The evidence given is similar to that contained in the written
statements previously given to the police and, since there is rarely any
substantial cross-examination, the witness's story is rarely shaken. It has
been suggested that it would be sufficient for the purpose, if the state-
ments previously given to the police were read out to the witness for his
approval and signature, and the witness made available only if cross-ex-
amination were required. If this were done, the court would have the
same evidence before it as it has under the present laborious procedure,
and the matter could be disposed of in a fraction of the time.
Difficulties have also occurred in connection with the publicity
which is given to these inquiries in sensational cases. It is hardly pos-
sible to find a jury at the subsequent trial which has not heard some-
thing of the newspaper reports, which are necessarily one-sided, since
only one side of the case will probably have been given at the inquiry.7"
It is possible for the inquiries to be held in private when this is required
by the interests of justice, 79 and this practice is sometimes followed.
C. The Juvenile Court8°
Separate courts for the treatment of juveniles were first set up under
the Children Act of 1908. A juvenile panel is elected from the bench of
76. Some Courts still write the deposition in long-hand.
77. The suggestion was made by Lord Goddard, then Lord Chief Justice, at a meeting
of one of the regional branches of the Magistrates' Association, November 5, 1959. A step
in this direction was recently taken in Children and Young Persons Act, 1963, c. 37, § 27,
which provides that in preliminary hearings before magistrates of charges of sexual offenses
against children, written statements of the child's evidence shall be admissible and the child
not called to give oral evidence, unless the defense objects to this course, or if the child's
attendance is required to establish identity.
78. The trial of Dr. Bodkin Adams in 1958 is a good example. The facts were dramatic,
and, after reading the reports of the preliminary hearing, at which no defense was offered,
the public was convinced of Dr. Adams' guilt. The trial was very different, and Dr. Adams
was acquitted. See BEDFORD, THE BEST WE CAN Do, and 20 MODwmr L. REV. 387 (1957).
79. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & I Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 4.
80. See generally, CAVENAGH, THE CHnID AND THE COURT; Children and Young Persons
Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, c. 12; Children Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 43; Criminal Justice Act,
1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 39; Children and Young Persons Act, 1963, c. 37.
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magistrates,oa and members of the panel retire from it at the age of
sixty-five. In dealing with children and young persons,"' whether as
offenders or as persons in need of care, protection or control, the court
is required to "have regard to the welfare of the child or young
person and shall in a proper case take steps for removing him from un-
desirable surroundings, and for securing that proper provision is made
for his education and training.""2 The emphasis is thus upon treatment,
not punishment.
The juvenile court has power to deal with all offenses other than
homicide sa A "young person" has the right to be tried by jury for an
indictable offense, or for an offense carrying, in the case of an adult, more
than three month's imprisonment,8 3 but this right is rarely exercised.
Because of this wider jurisdiction and of the smaller percentage of
traffic cases, statistics show a higher percentage of indictable offenses
in the juvenile court than in the adult court. In most cases, the defendant
admits his guilt, and the problems which face the court (and very
baffling they can be) are those of deciding the course which is best in
the interest of the child or young person. The procedure in court is kept
as informal as is consistent with the dignity of the court and the observ-
ance of the requirements of legal proof in a case which is contested. The
court tries to demonstrate to the child and his parents 4 that it is seeking
the best course for him, but it must at the same time ensure that the visit
to the court is an experience which the accused does not wish to repeat.
Great emphasis is placed in the juvenile court upon accurate and
up-to-date reports of the social, school and home background of the
accused. 5 The local authority and probation officers are required to
provide these reports which play a large part in the court's decision.
A problem arises in connection with the choice of the most suitable time
at which to obtain the reports. It is clearly most convenient for the
court to have the reports available at the time of the trial. This may be
difficult if the family is not co-operative, and impossible if the accused
is denying the charge. Provision is therefore made for an accused, after
a finding of guilt, to be remanded for a period not exceeding three
weeks, on bail or in custody, for further enquiries to be made. s6 At this
stage, it is in everyone's interest to produce satisfactory reports. Better
80a. Children and Young Persons Act, 1963, c. 37, § 17, Sched. 2.
81. Under the Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, 25 Geo. 5, c. 12, "children" means
persons under fourteen years of age, "young persons" means those between the ages of
fourteen and seventeen.
82. Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 44(1).
82a. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 21.
83. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 25.
84. Whose attendance can be required: Children and Young Persons Act, 1963, c. 37, § 25.
85. Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 35.
86. Rule 11, Summary Jurisdiction (Children and Young Persons Rules) 1933, and
Rule 22, Summary Jurisdiction (Children and Young Persons Rules) 1963.
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information is generally obtained after a remand, but it is unsatisfactory
to keep an accused waiting so long for the court's decision. In practice,
however, many cases are remanded for the reports.
Children and young persons are brought before the juvenile courts
under either of two main heads. First, that they have committed a
criminal offense. The age of criminal responsibility in England is ten,"7
but from that age to fourteen, the accused is presumed to be incapable
of forming the intent to commit a crime (doli incapax); but this pre-
sumption can be rebutted by proof of a "mischievous discretion"-that
is, by showing that the child knew that what he did was morally wrong."a
A finding of guilt in such circumstances counts as a criminal conviction,
but the Children and Young Persons Act 196387b provides that, after
such a convicted person has reached the age of 21, evidence of previous
convictions when he was under the age of fourteen shall be disregarded;
they therefore disappear from his "criminal record."
The second way in which a child or young person may be brought
before a juvenile court is upon an allegation that he is in need of "care,
protection or control."88 To come within this description, it is necessary
to show that the child or young person is "not receiving such care, pro-
tection and guidance as a good parent may reasonably be expected to
give" or "is beyond the control of his parent or guardian." In the case
of the former of these alternatives, other conditions must be shown to
exist, namely that he is "falling into bad associations or is exposed to
moral danger," or that "the lack of care, protection and guidance is
likely to cause him unnecessary suffering or seriously to affect his
health or proper development," or that certain offenses involving children
have been committed against the child or by or against other members
of the household. Proceedings of this type are usually brought by the
police or by the local authority. It was possible before the 1963 Act
came into force for parents to bring such proceedings themselves. This
was unsatisfactory, and amounted, in effect, to a public rejection of the
child by the parents, and created an even worse situation in the home if
the child returned. It is now provided, therefore, that parents cannot bring
such proceedings, but can, in suitable cases, require the local authority
to do so.8"
If the court finds that a child is in need of care, protection or con-
trol, its powers are more limited than those that would be exercisable in
87. Children and Young Persons Act, 1963, c. 37, § 16(1), amending the Children and
Young Persons Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, c. 17, in which the common law age of seven was
increased to eight.
87a. R. v. Owen (1830), 4 C. & P. 236.
87b. Sections 16(1),(2).
88. Children and Young Persons Act, 1963, c. 37, § 2 where the statutory definition of
this phrase is given.
89. Children and Young Persons Act, 1963, c. 37, § 3.
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the case of conviction of a criminal charge. No punitive element enters
into consideration; but the steps necessary for the welfare of the child
may be the same as they would be if an offense had been committed. The
court may, among other things, make a supervision order which places
the child or young person under the supervision of the probation officer
or "other suitable person" (usually an official of the Children's Depart-
ment of the local authority). The court may also take the child or
young person out of the custody of his parents and place him in the
care of the local authority or send him to an approved schoolf 0
This is not the place for an account of the punishments available
to the juvenile court. We have seen that the court must have regard
first and foremost to the welfare of the child or young person, and that
punishments are regarded only as occasions of being cruel in order to
be kind. Recent research into the question of the treatment of wayward
youth has underlined this aspect, and has also demonstrated the narrow
line between criminal cases and the "care, protection or control" cases.
Most children who are drifting into crime are in need of care, protection
or control, and those who are not properly cared for, protected or con-
trolled are likely to drift into crime. As individuals they are not very
different sorts of people. If methods of treatment can be found which
will successfully reclaim wayward youths and make them useful mem-
bers of society, the treatment which is appropriate to one is not neces-
sarily different from that accorded to the other. The Report of the
Ingleby Committee9 recommended that some of the methods which were
originally appropriate only in criminal cases should be made available
in care, protection and control cases as well,92 and that proceedings in
connection with children under the age of twelve should no longer be
brought as criminal cases, but should all be brought as applications to
the court for an order on the ground that the child is in need of "protec-
tion or discipline." If the allegation were proved, there would be very
little distinction in the forms of treatment, from which the court could
select the most appropriate, between cases in which the acts proved
would have constituted an offense by an adult and those in which they
would not. The 1963 Act, however, did not accept this suggestion, but
merely raised the age of criminal responsibility from eight to ten years.
A final word should be said on the question of the competence of
juvenile court panels to deal with the questions which come before them.
We have seen that no professional qualifications are necessary for ap-
pointment as a magistrate. Rarely do magistrates have legal or sociologi-
90. An approved school is one which has been officially approved by the Home Secretary
as suitable for the education and training of persons sent there by the Juvenile Court.
Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 79. Special schools are maintained
by the State for this purpose.
91. Cmd. 1191, 111 83-94 (1960).
92. Cmd. 1191, 89 (1960).
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cal qualifications. Suggestions have often been made to the effect that
a juvenile court should be staffed by trained experts, including lawyers,
psychiatrists and sociologists; and there is no doubt that England has
much to learn from experiments in American and Scandinavian jurisdic-
tions on the problem of finding people or organizations qualified to deal
with these questions." The curious thing about the English approach
to these matters is that there is general public trust and confidence in
the judiciary, but considerable suspicion of non-judicial experts and
officials. Magistrates, though not lawyers, do hold judicial positions and,
although they are criticized on many grounds, their bona fides is, in
general, undoubted. This is a factor of the greatest importance, and any
changes that are made in the composition of juvenile courts should be
such as to increase their expertise without risking the loss by the court
of its present reputation for impartiality and good faith.
D. The Problem of Punishment
Lay justices, being ordinary citizens of the community in which
they exercise jurisdiction, are very conscious of the responsibility which
they bear in the exercise of their powers. It is well that they should ask
themselves what justification there is for their having power to inflict
penalties, including the power of deprivation of liberty, upon their fellow
citizen, and well that they should try to understand something of the
theory of the punishments they impose.
The maximum punishments which a Magistrates' Court can im-
pose, subject always to the statutory maximum for the offense in ques-
tion, are:
(1) For indictable offenses-imprisonment for up to six months
on any one charge, and a maximum of two periods of six months to run
consecutively, or a fine up to 100 pounds, or both. 4
(2) For non-indictable offenses-whatever statutory penalty is
prescribed, even though, as in the case of a few summary offenses, the
maximum penalty is in excess of six months or 100 pounds." In certain
motoring offenses, the court may disqualify an offender from holding a
driving license.
The court may also, with consent of the accused, place him on
probation for a period of not less than one and not more than three
years. This means that he is required to be under the supervision of a
probation officer, to keep the peace and be of good behavior, and to
observe any other condition which the court imposes. The probationer
93. R. Hagen, 6 HOWARD JOURNAL 187; NYQUIST, JUVENILE JUSTICE; GRUNHUT, PENAL
REFORM 359-365 (1948).
94. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 108(1)(2).
95. Certain driving offenses, and some customs and excise offenses.
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is liable to be brought back to court if he is in breach of any of the
terms of the order, and may then be punished both for the breach and
for the original offense.98
The court may bind a person over to keep the peace and to be of
good behavior, and may require him to give securities, or imprison him
in default of securities. The justices may also discharge an offender
either absolutely or conditionally on his remaining free from further
conviction for a period of up to twelve months.1
7
The problem of selecting the appropriate punishment is a formid-
able task. Minor criminals usually find themselves in trouble because
of their incapacity and stupidity-because of their inability to live on
terms with society. With adults, as with juveniles, the main object of
the court in making its decision is the salvation of the individual. With
adult criminals, however, the prospects of salvation are often very
slight, and the community must be protected from their depredations.
The imposition of fines achieves little where the offender has no money
to pay. Opinions differ as to the efficacy of short terms of imprison-
ment which may have disastrous results upon a prisoner's wife and
family. But something must be done. The offense cannot be overlooked
and forgotten. An observer, almost any morning in Magistrates' Court,
will see a number of problems for which there are no satisfactory so-
lutions. The magistrates, or indeed, any judge of a criminal court, must
take comfort in the thought, that with the common sense, learning and
sympathy they possess, and bearing in mind the interests of all their




Something should be said of the civil and administrative duties of
magistrates although space will not allow these matters to be treated in
detail. Apart from matrimonial cases, these duties do not often give
rise to legal issues of great moment, but they do require an amount of
time and attention which is appropriate to their importance in the com-
munity, but which may be quite out of proportion to their legal signif-
icance.
1. DOMESTIC PROCEEDINGS9 8
A Magistrates' Court has no power to make any orders which affect
the status of marriage but, for various matrimonial offenses, the court
96. Regina v. Webb, [1953] 1 All. E.R. 1156; Regina v. Devine, [1956] 1 All. E. R.
548; Regina v. Calvert, [1963] 1 Weekly L.R. 151.
97. Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 58, § 7.
97a. In April, 1964, the Home Office published The Sentence of the Court, a handbook
for courts on the treatment of offenders.
98. See generally, Matrimonial Proceeding (Magistrates' Courts) Act, 1960, 8 & 9
Eliz. 2, c. 48; Maintenance Agreements Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 35; Maintenance
Order (Facilities for Enforcement) Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 33; and Magistrates'
Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6, 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, §§ 56-62.
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may, on application, make a "matrimonial order" which has the same
effect in practice as an order for judicial separation. The Matrimonial
Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act of 1960, lays down the grounds
on which a husband or wife may apply for an order, and states that the
order may contain provisions for the termination of the duty of co-
habitation, for the maintenance of the parties and the children, and for
the legal custody of, and for the access to, the children. In practice, the
matrimonial order is frequently the preliminary step in the presentation
of a petition for divorce.
When exercising these powers, the court must consist of two or three
magistrates, and so far as possible, there should be both a man and a
woman on the bench. Every effort is made to keep these proceedings
private and informal. The public is not entitled to be present, and the
press is restricted as to the amount of detail that it can publish. Appeal
from a magistrates' matrimonial order lies to the Divisional Court of
the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division.
It is in this field that magistrates are faced with the most difficult
and complicated legal questions. An attempt to explain them would
necessitate a minor treatise on nearly all aspects of matrimonial law.99
Magistrates are, of course, guided by their clerk on these matters, and
find that he needs to be consulted more often in matrimonial cases than
in any others. The questions which they have to decide are by no means
abstract legal problems. Above all others, these are situations of human
tragedy in which the lives, not only of the spouses, but also of the
children, are at stake. Probation officers are available to the court and
will sometimes be able to help the parties to find a solution which will
be more satisfactory than the pursuit of legal remedies, but such a situa-
tion is exceptional, for every effort to find such a solution will generally
have been made before the case reaches the stage of an application for an
order being heard. Little is publicly known, for obvious reasons, of this
side of the magistrates' work, but of the many and varied duties which a
magistrate is called upon to undertake, these are the ones above all
others which call for the highest combination of skill and judgment and
human understanding.
2. AFFILIATION
Any single woman' 0 may apply to a magistrate of the area in
which she resides for a summons against the man whom she alleges to be
the father of her illegitimate child.' The court is required to hear the
complaint and, in so doing, must hear the mother's evidence, which, if
99. PUGH, MATRIMONIAL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE MAGISTRATES (Butterworth, 1961).
100. This term may include a widow or married woman living away from her husband.
101. Affiliation Proceedings Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 1.
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the court is to make an order, must be corroborated'0 2 in a material
particular.
If the court is satisfied with the evidence presented, it may adjudge
the defendant to be the father of the child, and may, if it thinks fit, make
an order requiring him to pay a weekly sum not exceeding fifty shillings
per week, and in addition, the expenses incidental to the birth of the
child, or, if it has died, the funeral expenses. Orders for periodical pay-
ments of money are usually made so as to require payments to continue
until the child is sixteen years old, but unless an age is stated, payments
will cease when the child is thirteen.
3. ADOPTION
A Magistrates' Court, in addition to the High Court and the County
Court, has jurisdiction to make an adoption order, authorizing an appli-
cant to adopt an infant. 03 This order has the effect of transferring to the
adopter all the rights and duties of the natural parents or previous
guardian of the infant." 4
This jurisdiction is always exercised, in Magistrates' Courts, by
those magistrates who are appointed to be members of the juvenile court.
At the hearing, which is in private, they are presented with detailed
reports prepared by the authorities who are supervising the adoption, and
they are in a position to question the adoptor, and, if he is of sufficient
years, the infant. They must ensure, in the case of illegitimate children,
that the consent of the natural parent or present guardian is given in all
cases except those in which a dispensation is given, as where the natural
parent cannot be found or where he unreasonably refuses.
As long as the preparatory work is properly done and a clear report
made, little difficulty usually faces the magistrates in these cases. The
proceedings are by consent and everyone is working toward the same
end. In nearly every case the plans which are submitted to the magis-
trates for approval are clearly in the interests of the infant. 0
4. LIQUOR LICENSING
Each licensing district must appoint a Licensing Committee con-
sisting of not less than five, and not more than fifteen, magistrates, and
this committee is responsible for the issuance of licenses to sell liquor
within its area.' 06
102. Id. § 4. Reffell v. Morton, (1906) 70 J.P. 347.
103. Adoption Act, 1950, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 26, §§ 1, 8(1).
104. Id. § 10.
105. See generally, CLARx HALL & MORRISON, CT-ILDREN AND YOUNG PERSONS (6th ed.
1960, Div. 3); for some problems, see Re J.S., [1959] 3 All. E.R. 856 (Ch.); Re C.S.C.,
[1960] 1 All E.R. 711 (Ch.); Re D., [1958] 1 All. E.R. 427 (CA.); Re P., [1962] 3 All.
E.R. 789 (Ch.); Re G., [1963] 1 All. E.R. 20 (CA.).
106. Licensing Act, 1953, 1 & 2 Eliz. 2, c. 46, § 2(4), sch. I, pt. 1, §11 , 2.
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In the first two weeks of February in each year, the committee holds
its general annual licensing meeting at which applications for new li-
censes, renewal of licenses, removal of licenses, transfer of licenses from
one licensee to another, and all matters concerning the sale of liquor, are
heard. Licenses are granted to applicants in respect of certain premises
and the license runs for a year starting on the 5th of April. Dates and
times are also arranged for at least four transfer sessions to be held
during the year. At transfer sessions the committee formerly dealt
only with the transfer of an existing license from a retiring licensee to
his successor, but may now deal also with the granting of licenses, and
most of the other business transacted at the annual meeting.
The hours during which liquor may be sold are prescribed by sta-
tute" 7 and are subject to local variations and the discretion of the
Licensing Committee. Provision is also made for an appeal to Quarter
Sessions by any person who is aggrieved by any decision of the justices,
and for compensation to licensees who suffer financial loss when their
licenses are not renewed on the ground that their premises are re-
dundant.' 8
5. BETTING LICENSING
The Betting and Gaming Act of 1960, made certain amendments to
the existing law, and provided, among other things, for the granting of
permits to persons who wished to operate as bookmakers, and of licenses
in respect of premises which may be used by the public for the purpose
of betting. The authority responsible in such matters is, in England, a
committee of the justices in each petty sessional area, consisting of no
less than five and no more than fifteen justices. They must hold their
meetings at least four times a year.
6. REGISTRATION OF CLUBS
Difficulties have arisen in recent years concerning the control of
clubs in which intoxicating liquor has been sold. Until the passage of
the Licensing Act of 1961, anyone could start a club by paying a fee of
five shillings to the local clerk to the justices and the club could then be
registered and supply liquor to its members. Even after the passage of
this act, there was little control over the running of the clubs, unless
the police were able to prove a contravention of the law, in which case,
proceedings could then be taken to strike the club off the register. It was
well known that many such clubs had become centers where liquor
was sold outside the permitted hours, where unsavory attractions were
offered to members, where membership had become a farce because any-
one could join by signing a book, and where large profits were made for
107. Licensing Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 61, §§ 5-11.
108. Licensing Act, 1953, 1 & 2 Eliz. 2, c. 46, § 35(1) (Appeals); § 17(1) (Com-
pensation for non-renewal of an old on-license).
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the managements by disregard of the law. Of course, warning systems
within the club could make it very difficult for the police to discover
what was going on inside.
The act lays down a number of qualifications for registration, which,
without going into details, are an attempt to simplify the running of
bona fide clubs, and to exclude from registration clubs run by promoters
whose object is to earn large sums of money by disregarding the law.
The duty of examining applications for registration is placed upon the
magistrates. The inquiry into the qualification of every club in the district
is a formidable undertaking, and the decision to give this duty to the
magistrates is a further example of the way in which miscellaneous
duties which need to be performed in the community are cast upon
the magistrates.
V. RECENT CHANGES IN PROCEDURE
A. Magistrates' Courts Acts, 1952-1957
It has long been possible for magistrates to try a summary offense
in the absence of the accused. Since 1848, they have been able, on proof
of service of the summons, either to try the case or to issue a warrant
for the arrest of the accused.'09
A new and simplified procedure was introduced by the Magistrates'
Courts Act of 1957.110 If the prosecutor applies this procedure, the ac-
cused may ask the magistrates to try the case in his absence, without
his running the risk of being subjected to a warrant for his arrest if
the magistrates decide, for some reason, to require his presence. A state-
ment of facts is prepared by the police from the statements of the wit-
nesses and is sent to the accused with the summons and with a form on
which he may signify a guilty plea in writing and make a statement in
mitigation. The proceedings in court are based entirely upon the written
documents. The prosecution may not introduce additional matter, nor
may the court ask questions. The fact that the proceedings are in writing
saves time and expense and is greatly to everyone's convenience. So
great is the convenience that, in prosecutions for minor (mostly traffic)
offenses, even defendants who believe that they have a defense to the
charge have been known to plead guilty under this procedure. They
calculate that the fine which the magistrates will impose will be less than
the expense of the travelling to court plus the loss of earnings caused by
an appearance. This procedure is initiated by the prosecution, but can
only be followed through with the written consent of the accused. He
may, of course, prefer to appear in court and to allow the trial to proceed
in the ordinary way.
109. Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848, §§ 2, 13 (now Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952,
15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 15).
110. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 29, § 1.
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The procedure is applicable only where the charge is of a summary
offense which is not also triable on indictment, and for which the maxi-
mum punishment is not greater than a term of imprisonment for three
months. The service on the accused of a notice giving an explanation of
this procedure and of a statement of the facts of the case, must be proved.
Also, no sentence which involves a term of detention or imprisonment or
any disqualification may be passed11' without adjournment for the pur-
pose of giving the accused an opportunity of attending."'
This procedure is an attempt to save the court, both parties and
the witnesses, from unnecessary expenditure of time and money, while
at the same time, not to deprive the accused of any of the protection
which is normally afforded to him in a criminal trial. It has been con-
sidered to be a success and, speaking purely in numerical terms, the
majority of cases coming before Magistrates' Courts are now dealt with
in this way.
B. "Ticket" Fines
In this present age, it is inevitable that most of the cases dealt with
in Magistrates' Courts are road traffic offenses of one sort or another.
The problem of finding the best way to deal with the volume of cases is
no easy matter. England has not tried the experiment of creating special
traffic courts which deal only with traffic offenses. These offenses are
generally treated like any other.
It has been seen, however, that a specially quick and convenient
procedure was established by the Magistrates' Court Act of 1957 for
dealing with minor offenses. In practice, those which are dealt with in
this way are nearly all traffic offenses. It might therefore be said, that
there is, in effect, a special procedure for minor traffic offenses, although
the matter is brought before the ordinary court. Recently, experiments
have been made for certain offenses whereby these offenders may, if they
wish, pay a fixed penalty to the court instead of being prosecuted.
The Road Traffic and Roads Improvements Act of 1960,"' intro-
duced a system of "ticket fines" with respect to the offenses of illegal
parking or obstruction, leaving vehicles without displaying the lights
required by law, and non-payment of charges due at parking meters.
A constable".4 may give to the defendant, or place on the car, a notice",
"offering the opportunity of the discharge of any liability to conviction
of that offense by the payment of a fixed penalty," which is set by the
111. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 29, § 1(2).
112. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 14(3).
113. Road Traffic and Roads Improvement Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 63, § 1.
114. Or a traffic warden, who has, for these purposes, the same powers as a police
constable. Road Traffic and Roads Improvement Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 63, § 2.
115. In the form prescribed by the Fixed Penalty (Procedure) Regulations, 1960 (§ I,
1960, No. 1600).
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statute at forty shillings or half the maximum amount to which a first
offender would be liable, whichever is less." 6 If the person decides to
accept liability and to pay the fine, he must pay the appropriate sum to
the magistrates' clerk of the district. He will be immune from prosecu-
tion for twenty-one days from the date of the notice, but if he does
not pay the fine within that time, he may thereafter be prosecuted. The
payments are treated for all purposes as fines imposed by a court of
summary jurisdiction. The system applies only to the areas which have
been specified; it is in operation, according to information available
at the time of writing, in about thirty cities or towns, and the number
is increasing.
VI. LEGAL AID".
Free legal aid is available with most of the proceedings before
Magistrates' Courts, but the granting of such aid is always subject to
the discretion of the magistrates. In criminal cases, whether in a sum-
mary trial or in committal proceedings, aid may be granted if the de-
fendant has insufficient means to enable him legal representation, and if
it is desirable in the interests of justice that he should have free legal
aid." 8 Aid is available on these terms not only in proceedings in which
the guilt or innocence of an accused is in issue, but also where, after a
plea or finding of guilt, the question is one of sentence. Provision on
similar lines is also made for free legal aid in trials on indictment and
in appeals from Magistrates' Courts; but such matters are outside the
scope of the present discussion."'
Provision is also made for granting legal aid in connection with
civil litigation. The scheme covers civil litigation at all levels, but we need
not trouble here with the details, since, so far as magistrates are con-
cerned, legal aid is only available in civil proceedings in a limited class
of cases, principally matrimonial proceedings and affiliation orders.120 The
administration of legal aid in civil proceedings is the responsibility of
the Law Society.' 2 '
116. Road Traffic and Roads Improvement Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 63, § 1(9).
117. JACKSON, MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 130-135 (3d ed. 1960).
118. Poor Prisoners' Defense Act, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 32, § 2, as amended by
Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, 12-14 Geo. 6, c. 51, § 18.
119. Poor Prisoners' Defense Act, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 32, § 1, and Summary Juris-
diction (Appeals) Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 38, § 2, as amended by Legal Aid and Advice
Act, 1949, 12-14 Geo. 5, c. 51, § 18.
120. There is also the system of dock-side briefs. Any prisoner who can produce £2 4/6d.
is entitled to select any of the counsel robed and present in court, and irrespective of the
means of the prisoner, the counsel selected must conduct the defence for this fee. This
method gives very little time for the preparation of the defence. JACKSON, op. cit. supra
note 117, at 133, n.1.
121. Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, 12-14 Geo. 6, c. 51, § 1(2), sch. 1, pt. 1, 3, § 8;
S.I. 1961 No. 554.
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It has been seen that the granting of free legal aid in criminal cases
in courts of summary jurisdiction is entirely within the discretion of
the magistrates. In the nature of things, this discretion is very difficult
to exercise. The magistrates are asked to decide, before they inquire
into a case, whether or not it is in the interests of justice that the appli-
cant should have free legal advice. The decision is dependent upon
matters which will arise in the hearing, and the hearing has ex hypothesi
not taken place.
In practice, however, the exercise of this discretion does not prove
to be as difficult as one might expect. So far as the means of the defend-
ant are concerned, he may be required to furnish a written statement
on a prescribed form, and the penalties for making false statements
are severe. 2 ' The information supplied is sufficient to enable the magis-
trates to determine this aspect of the question. More difficult is the
question of the requirements of the interests of justice. However, it is
usually possible to foresee, from the nature of the circumstances, whether
any issues will arise which require consideration and presentation by a
lawyer. If magistrates are hearing the trial of a case in which the defend-
ant is not professionally represented, and during the trial issues arise on
which they think that the defendant should be advised, the case can be
stopped and adjourned for a period of time which will allow the defend-
ant to take legal advice, and a legal aid certificate granted if the defend-
ant's means are insufficient. Magistrates are instructed that if there
is any doubt on the question of the sufficiency of the means of the
applicant or as to the desirability of granting free legal aid, those doubts
should be resolved in the applicant's favor.122a
VII. JUDICIAL CONTROL
Magistrates' Courts are subject to two forms of supervision by
superior courts-a direct control by way of appeal, and indirectly by
means of the prerogative orders. There is also the possibility that in some
circumstances a magistrate may render himself personally liable to an
action for damages, but this raises difficulties in theory and rarely hap-
pens in practice.
A. Appeals
In order to consider the avaliability of appeals from Magistrates'
Courts, it is necessary to distinguish between the two main functions
of the magistrates in their judicial capacity. When the magistrates are
sitting on a preliminary inquiry into an indictable offense, the only
question they have to decide is whether there is sufficient evidence to
122. Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, 12-14 Geo. 6, c. 51, § 18(3) ; Legal Aid in
Criminal Cases (Statement of Means) Regulations, 1952 (S.I. 1952, No. 391).
122a. Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, 12-14 Geo. 6, c. 51, § 18(1).
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justify committing the accused for trial at Quarter Sessions, the Assizes,
or the Central Criminal Court (the "Old Bailey"). No question of an
appeal arises at this stage, since there is as yet no conviction from which
to appeal. If, however, the accused is committed for trial and convicted
at Quarter Sessions or Assizes, there is, subject to certain conditions 2
a right of appeal against both the conviction and the sentence to the
Court of Criminal Appeal, with the further possibility of an appeal to
the House of Lords.
When the magistrates are sitting as a court of summary jurisdic-
tion, the position is rather more complicated, since an appeal may lie
either to Quarter Sessions or to the High Court. The right of appeal to
Quarter Sessions is a statutory one and must be expressly conferred, but
in many cases it lies for questions of fact as well as of law. The principal
cases in which an appeal may be taken are, on conviction of a criminal
offense, (a) against the sentence alone, when the accused pleaded guilty,
and (b) against the conviction or the sentence, when he pleaded not
guilty. 4 But there are a large number of individual statutory rights
of appeal. Two of the most important of these are appeals against an
affiliation order, or the refusal to make, or from the revocation, revival
or variation of such an order, and appeals against an order under the
Justices of the Peace Act of 1361, which requires a person to enter into
recognizances to keep the peace or be of good behavior.
125
The alternative to an appeal to Quarter Sessions is an appeal "by
way of case stated" to the High Court, which is heard by a divisional
court of three judges of the Queen's Bench Division. This is a procedure
whereby the justices may, and in some cases must, "state a case"-
submit a statement of the principles of law on which they have based
their decision-for the consideration of the divisional court. This form
of appeal, therefore, lies only for questions of law, but the divisional
court has power, not only to affirm or reverse the decision, but also to
amend it or remit the matter to the magistrates with its own opinion.
A case can also be stated for the opinion of the divisional court during
the course of or after an appeal to Quarter Sessions on the same condi-
tions. A point particularly to be noted in relation to the appeal by way of
case stated on a point of law is that the prosecution has a right of appeal.
This is one of the rare cases in English law where there can be an appeal
against an acquittal. From the divisional court, an appeal lies in criminal
matters directly to the House of Lords.' In civil matters, however,
there is a further appeal to the court of appeal, subject to the leave of
the divisional court or of the court of appeal itself being obtained. When
123. Court of Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, § 3.
124. Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 83.
125. Magistrates' Courts (Appeals from Binding Over Orders) Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2,
c. 44, § 1(1). See Shelton v. Bromfield Justices, [1964] 2 All E.R. 131.
126. Administration of Justice Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 65, § 1.
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a criminal case is heard by Quarter Sessions sitting as a court of first
instance, an appeal lies to the court of criminal appeal, and thence to
the House of Lords.
B. Prerogative Orders
The provision of any sort of appeal from the justices is a compara-
tively modern phenomenon. As we have seen, the medieval and Tudor
justices of the peace were controlled directly by the King's Council,
but even when this supervision lapsed, the only check exercised by
higher courts on the judicial activities of the magistracy was by means
of the three prerogative writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari.
Now known as prerogative orders, these three remedies are still much
used as a means of enforcing technical correctness in the proceedings of
Magistrates' Courts, as, in another field, they are the main means of
judicial control of administrative tribunals. Prerogative orders are not
appeals; they lie to enforce the performance of a duty and to control
jurisdiction or the exercise of a discretion. They are not designed to allow
the higher courts to rehear the case on the merits. Broadly speaking,
mandamus is the appropriate remedy when the justices refuse to exercise
jurisdiction. Prohibition will prevent them from continuing proceedings
in excess of jurisdiction or contravention of law and certiorari will quash
a decision made ultra vires or in breach of the rules of natural justice,
or where there is an error of law on the face of the record.
Mandamus only lies where there is a legal duty to act, not where
the justices have a discretion. But even when the powers are discretionary
the remedy is only entirely excluded if the discretion is unlimited, be-
cause even discretion must be exercised "judicially." The order may
issue to enforce any public duty, whether judicial or administrative, but
most frequently issues to justices to compel them to exercise jurisdiction.
Thus, where justices are entrusted with jurisdiction to hear applications
for licenses, it is not a proper exercise of that jurisdiction for them to
decide a priori that they will not grant certain kinds of licenses and
mandamus will issue to compel them to hear each case on its merits. 27
Prohibition and certiorari cover much the same ground, but at
different stages of the proceedings. Both issue only to an inferior court,
or body "exercising legal jurisdiction," the first to prevent the wrong-
ful exercise of jurisdiction, the second to quash a decision defective on
this ground or for an error of law appearing on the face of the record.
Certiorari is the more common of the two and has been issued against
the justices in a large variety of cases. A significant group of authorities
deals with defects caused by interference by the magistrates' clerk in
the fact-finding or sentencing functions of the justices.1'2  This inter-
127. Rex v. Rotherham Licensing Justices, [1939] 2 All. E.R. 710 (K.B.).
128. See III(E) of this article's text supra.
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ference is always well-meant, but is particularly dangerous since the
justices may be all too ready in weighing the evidence to rely on the
advice of the experienced, legally-trained clerk. Thus, in a recent case,
a conviction by the justices was quashed because, before making their
decision, they had received a private note from the clerk pointing out
inconsistencies in the evidence of the accused.'29 Another difficulty
likely to arise with lay magistrates drawn from all walks of life is that
one or more of the justices may in some way be connected with one of
the parties and thereby be open to the charge of bias. In one recent
application for certiorari, six out of the seven licensing justices who
heard an application for a liquor license were members of the applicant
cooperative society. There was no suggestion of bad faith or that any
bias had in fact been shown, but the justices were automatically dis-
qualified from hearing the application.'
Certiorari for error of law on the face of the record is a very old
method of controlling justices of the peace which has only recently been
revived.'' The writ issued to quash a decision for an error of law ap-
parent on the record from the seventeenth century onwards, and the
King's Bench compelled the justices to record the proceedings on sum-
mary convictions at great length, so that the errors appearing on the
record would include, not only errors of substantive law, but also lack
of evidence and trivial formal defects. The all-embracing scope of cer-
tiorari which resulted from this full record tended to defeat the purpose
of summary jurisdiction, since some ground could be found in it for
taking practically any case to a higher court. Consequently, the Sum-
mary Jurisdiction Act of 1848, prescribed a standard form of convic-
tion which omitted all mention of the evidence or the reasoning by which
the decision had been reached. The effect of the enactment was that only
the most fundamental errors of jurisdiction were likely to appear on
the record at all, and this ground for certiorari fell into disuse. It was
revived in 1951 as a means of controlling administrative tribunals," 2
some of which were required to give reasons for their decisions as part
of the record and, as far as administrative tribunals are concerned, the
scope of this remedy has probably been widened by the Tribunals and
Inquiries Act of 1958.1" However, until recently, it did not seem that
the position with regard to the summary criminal jurisdiction of magis-
trates would be greatly changed, because of the limited nature of the
written record. In one case, however, the divisional court issued certio-
129. Regina v. Stafford Justices, [1962] 1 Weekly L.R. 456 (Q.B.).
130. Regina v. Barnsley Licensing Justices, [1960] 2 Q.B. 167. On the particular facts,
the disqualification did not involve quashing the decision made. See Licensing Act, 1953,
1 & 2 Eliz. 2, c. 46, § 48(5).
131. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIOx 294 (1959).
132. Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, [1952] 1 K.B. 338.
133. Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Elis. 2, c. 66, § 12, provides that a
large number of tribunals must, if requested to do so, give reasons for their decisions.
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rari to quash a decision of the justices when the error of law was apparent
only from an oral statement made by the chairman of the justices when
their decision was announced, on the ground that it was "this oral order
and not the written register of convictions which the applicant must seek
to quash. ' 134 The decision has aroused criticism, 3 ' but if the definition
of a record is to be expanded to include evidence other than the written
records of the case, then this ground of certiorari is likely to become of
considerable importance.
These three remedies can be, and frequently are, combined in some
way. This is usually the case because certiorari only quashes a decision,
and so it is often combined with mandamus in order to have the case
sent back for a rehearing. Alternatively, certiorari may be combined
with prohibition, in order to quash the decision already given and pre-
vent further proceedings of the same kind. Mandamus is also a con-
venient way of compelling the justices to state a case for the opinion of
the High Court. The prerogative orders are not free from difficulty;
indeed, they are in many ways procedurally cumbersome. However,
they are useful means of separating off the technical defects, which are
likely to be the most common ground of complaint in the decisions of
lay magistrates, from the substantive issues which are the proper subject
of an appeal.
C. Personal Liability
The extent to which justices of the peace may incur personal civil
liability in the performance of their judicial duties is still a disputed
question. The relevant statute, the Justices' Protection Act of 1848, is
by no means clear, and the case law consists in the main of inconclusive,
and sometimes conflicting, dicta. It has been suggested that much of the
confusion is due to the tendency of text book writers to equate the
justices of the peace with other judges in a single generalization on
liability."' The true position would seem to be that the justices are not
necessarily in the same position as the judges of superior courts, and
their personal liability may depend on the nature of their jurisdiction
and the circumstances of the wrong complained of in each particular
case.
The first distinction which must be made is between judicial words
and judicial acts, for there is no doubt that justices of the peace are
absolutely protected in actions for defamation for words spoken while
performing judicial functions.3 7 The defense of absolute privilege is,
in fact, available to any tribunal which is "exercising functions equiv-
134. Regina v. Chertsey Justices, [1961] 2 Weekly L.R. 442, 447.
135. 77 L.Q. REV. 157; 77 L.Q. REV. 322 (1961).
136. Thompson, 21 MODEmN L. REV. 517, 526 (1958).
137. Law v. Llewellyn, [1906] 1 K.B. 487.
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alent to those of an established court of justice."' 38 It follows that
absolute privilege does not cover words spoken by a justice while per-
forming a purely administrative function, as, for example, hearing
applications for liquor licenses.'3 9 As far as privilege in defamation is
concerned, the liability of a justice of the peace does not differ from
that of any other judicial officer.
When judicial acts are in question, liability may vary according
to whether the justices are acting within their jurisdiction or not. Any
person who is injured by an act done by a justice without or in excess of
jurisdiction, may maintain an action against the justice, unless the latter
neither knew nor ought to have known of the facts (as distinct from the
law) which deprived him of jurisdiction. 4 ° Where the justice was acting
without jurisdiction, it is not necessary to allege that he acted maliciously
and without reasonable and probable cause.' 4 ' Section 2 of tie Justice's
Protection Act imposes one further proviso in such cases-that no action
lies for anything done under a conviction or order until the conviction
has been quashed. The intention of the legislators here seems to have
been to prevent civil courts from commenting on the validity of a con-
viction before that conviction has been considered by the appropriate
appellate court on the criminal side. But the drafting of the section is
not clear and its interpretation has caused some difficulty.'
The liability of justices acting within their jurisdiction is covered
by section 1 of the Justices' Protection Act, which provides that every
action brought against a justice of the peace for an act done by him in
the execution of his duty, with respect to any matter within his juris-
diction, "shall be an Action on the Case as for a Tort; and in the declara-
tion it shall be expressly alleged that such Act was done maliciously
and without reasonable and probable cause; and if . . . the plaintiff
shall fail to prove such Allegation, he shall be nonsuit, or a Verdict
shall be given for the defendant." The interpretation to be given to this
section is doubtful. It is quite clear that justices are protected by the
statute for any act done within their jurisdiction, which is not proved to
have been done maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause.
However, it cannot therefore be assumed that, if malice and absence of
reasonable cause are alleged and proved, an action will always lie. The
section does not create a new cause of action; it assumes the existence
of a common law tort and the position of the common law on this point
before 1848 is uncertain. Halsbury states categorically that magistrates
138. O'Connor v. Waldron, [1935] A.C. 76, 81 (Can.).
139. Attwood v. Chapman, [1914] 3 K.B. 275.
140. Abbott v. Sullivan, [1952] 1 K.B. 189, 217; Polley v. Fordham, [1904] 91 L.T.R.
(n.s.) 525 (K.B.). It may be that this exception should be confined to the facts of the
particular case, i.e., liability for trespass.
141. Justices' Protection Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vict., c. 44, § 2.
142. O'Connor v. Isaacs, [1956] 2 Q.B. 288.
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are liable to an action for damages when they have acted maliciously
and without reasonable and probable cause, 43 and there are certainly
cases which seem to assume that this is so, without actually deciding
it.14' There are no binding authorities on the point, either before or since
the statute, and there are dicta to the contrary suggesting that, in re-
spect of judicial acts within his jurisdiction, a justice is absolutely pro-
tected. 45 On this basis, the only effect of section 1 was to create a
qualified immunity for purely ministerial acts. One attractive, though
perhaps not very tidy, solution of the problem is that immunity for
malicious acts is confined to courts of record, and that a justice of the
peace is absolutely protected for acts done maliciously but within his
jurisdiction when acting as a court of record. When discharging judicial
functions otherwise than as a court of record, he is protected only if he
acts in good faith. 4 ' Whatever view of the authorities is adopted, it is
something of a tribute to the work of the justices of the peace that
their liability for malicious acts should have been left undecided for so
long.
Attempts to sue magistrates personally are, however, sometimes
made, although these actions are usually either compromised or dis-
missed. Under the existing law, a magistrates' courts committee may
authorize the payment out of local funds of any costs incurred by, or
damages awarded against, a justice in defending any legal proceedings
taken against him in respect of any act done in the execution of his duty
out of Quarter Sessions. 147 Costs incurred by a justice in defending an
action in respect of any act done in County Quarter Sessions may
similarly be paid out of public funds, but in the case of Quarter Sessions
there is no provision for the payment of damages awarded against a
justice in such an action. 48 No provision is made for actions against
clerks to justices, clerks of the peace, or recorders. A Working Party
on the Expenses of Legal Proceedings against Justices and Clerks,
appointed by the Home Secretary, recommended that magistrates and
clerks should be entitled to be indemnified out of public funds for any
act done in good faith and reasonably in the execution of his duties, and
that for this purpose no distinction should be made between judicial
and administrative acts. The indemnity would be available to magis-
143. 25 HALSBURY, LAWS oF ENGLAND 160 (3d ed. 1960).
144. E.g., Linford v. Fitzroy, 13 Q.B. 240, 116 Eng. Rep. 1255 (1849) ; Pease v. Chaytor,
1 B. & S. 658, 121 Eng. Rep. 859 (K.B. 1861).
145. Everett v. Griffiths, [1921] 1 A.C. 631, 666.
146. Thompson, 21 MODERN L. REV. 517 (1958). A court of record is a court which
has jurisdiction to fine and imprison, or a court with jurisdiction to try civil causes according
to the common law in matters involving forty shillings or more. A justice of the peace is,
therefore, acting as a court of record when exercising summary criminal jurisdiction.
Examples of discharging judicial functions otherwise than as a court of record would be
the grant of warrants of arrest, search warrants, remands in custody, etc. Id. at 521, 533.
147. Justices of the Peace Act, 1949, 12-14 Geo. 6, c. 101, §§ 25, 26.
148. Local Government Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., c. 41, § 66.
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trates, recorders, chairmen of Quarter Sessions, clerks to justices and
clerks of the peace, and would cover the reasonable costs of the defense,
costs or damages awarded against a justice or clerk, or any reasonable
amount paid in settlement of an action.149
Magistrates are, of course, liable to criminal prosecution for gross
misconduct in the execution of their office. Most of the cases are of some
antiquity, but some examples of gross misconduct for which magistrates
have been prosecuted are extortion, acting where they were directly in-
terested, the improper conviction of an innocent person, refusing bail
improperly, the grant or refusal of licenses from corrupt motives, and
neglect of duty in not using force to suppress a riot.'50
VIII. PROBLEMS
It is remarkable, to say the least, to realize that a large proportion
of the criminal prosecutions and a small but not unimportant number
of civil matters are dealt with in England by unpaid citizens with no
legal qualifications. We should consider whether, as a system, it is
satisfactory. "To cold detached calculations-to a mind, let us say, like
that of Jeremy Bentham-our system of lay justice is among those
British legacies of history, including the British constitution itself, which
obviously cannot work, or at all events cannot do so except in defiance
of all reason and probability."' The system has the advantage of being
economical. It would be a large financial operation to provide profes-
sional lawyers to do the work which is now being done free of charge by
the 16,000 or so amateur magistrates who are currently sitting.
It is not often, of course, that controversial legal questions arise.
However, they sometimes do arise and often upon a problem of con-
struction of a regulation creating a minor offense, or on a point which
has never been taken to the High Court. Even if there is authority on
the point, this authority is not produced to the court with the clarity
and efficiency that would be assumed in a higher court. The magistrates,
not knowing what cases they will be hearing until their arrival in court,
have no opportunity to look up the law for themselves. On these matters,
as we have seen, they are dependent on their clerks, who will know what
points are likely to arise and will be prepared for them, and commonly
will have been informed beforehand of the authorities that will be relied
on.
From the small number of appeals from decisions of Magistrates'
149. Report of the Working Party on the Expenses of Legal Proceedings against
Justices and Clerks, 1961.
150. Rex v. Jones, 1 Wils. 7, 95 Eng. Rep. 462 (K.B. 1742); Rex v. Davis, Lofft 62,
98 Eng. Rep. 534 (K.B. 1772); Rex v. Webster, 3 T.R. 388, 100 Eng. Rep. 636 (K.B.
1789); Regina v. Badger, 4 Q.B. 468, 114 Eng. Rep. 975 (1843); Rex v. Holland & Forster,
1 T.R. 692, 99 Eng. Rep. 1324 (KB. 1787); Rex .v. Pinney, 3 St. Tr. (N.S.) 11, 17, 110
Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B. 1832).
151. ALLEN, THE QUEEN'S PEACE 179 (1953).
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Courts, statistics'52 will give the impression that there is little dissatis-
faction with the results of their work. These figures, however, should
be read in perspective. As explained above, the justices hear little
argument between high-powered lawyers whose clients are determined
to establish their defense, at whatever cost. The defendants are usually
not legally represented, and would not contemplate an appeal even if
legal questions could be raised. Indeed, as we have seen, defendants
have been known to plead guilty in order to save the expense and loss
of earnings involved in coming to court rather than to put forward a
possible defense.
From the point of view of technical legal efficiency, the amateur
magistrates could not demonstrate superiority over the professionals.
Another criticism which is sometimes directed against the magistrates is
that they are too much inclined to decide a case upon a general im-
pression and too little upon the precise evidence. The lawyer is more
ready than the layman to appreciate the difference between a situation
in which a man is "obviously guilty" and one in which he is proved by
the evidence to be guilty. This difficulty may be aggravated by the fact
that the magistrate is responsible, historically, for the keeping of the
peace. From this point of view, the magistrates' duty is too closely as-
sociated with that of the police. If an offense has been committed, it is
satisfactory, from their point of view, to bring someone to justice.
And, as has been pointed out, the fact that prosecutions are undertaken
by the police may add to the impression that the proceeding is executive
rather than judicial.
These dangers are endemic in the system. The important thing is
for the magistrates to be aware of them, and to ensure that they are
not influenced by these factors. The clerk, of course, will advise on the
question of admissibility of evidence, but it is for the magistrates them-
selves to determine how much weight should be given to any piece of
admissible evidence.
A further problem, and this is by no means limited to Magistrates'
Courts, relates to consistency of sentence. Criticisms on this ground are
inevitable. It is not to be expected that groups of citizens throughout
the country will have exactly the same views as to the appropriate
penalty for a particular offense. The problem is more serious when, as
is usually the case, different groups of magistrates sit on different days
of the week, or when more than one court sits on the same day. Unless
there is a consistent sentencing policy, variations in penalties for similar
offenses give the appearance of injustice.
Some of the criticism which is based upon inconsistency of sen-
tencing is, however, unfounded. The court does not give reasons in open
152. Criminal Statistics, 1961, Cmd. 1779, Table XIII, p. 77.
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court for its decisions, and the cases are not reported. Two prosecutions
for the same offense may, of course, have widely different features.
These will have been taken into account by the magistrates, but there
is no way in which the public and the press can know what factors were
considered. It would be an error to try to unify punishments for par-
ticular offenses; the important factor is that magistrates should apply
a consistent policy in determining sentences.
With many minor offenses, especially those to which no moral
blame is attached, many courts use a list of standard penalties, which
are regarded as the norm. The penalty imposed will be greater or less
if there are special circumstances to justify it. This practice has been
found helpful in the trial of traffic offenses. A list of these penalties has
been published in The Magistrate.5 '
Criticism breaks out from time to time and is directed against both
the composition of Magistrates' Courts and against their work gener-
ally. The problem of appointment of magistrates has been discussed.' 54
The magistracy, like the police, have lost much public sympathy because
of their responsibility for dealing with traffic infringements. In this
sphere they necessarily become unpopular with a large, influential and
law-abiding portion of the community. It is in this respect that most
of the criticism is heard. The possibility of using traffic wardens and
special traffic courts has been mentioned. 155
Some of the inevitable disadvantages of an unprofessional, unpaid
magistracy have been noted. It should be remembered, however, that
the magistrates' jurisdiction is limited to summary trial; there is no
jury and the magistrates must perform this duty as well as that of
judge. The jury is essentially a body of local citizens, who are required
to give a decision, based upon their common-sense, upon the issue of
guilty or not guilty. For this purpose the magistrates should be well
chosen. Of the duties of the judge which they must perform, there are
basically two. First, they must apply the law. They are, as we have seen,
advised by their clerk on this, and each new magistrate is expected to
take a course of instruction in his duties during his first year of office.
Second, they must determine the sentence to be imposed when a de-
fendant is found guilty. Except in cases where the sentence is automati-
cally determined by the law, the selection of the appropriate sentence has
always been the duty of the judge. Modern penologists challenge this
practice. Judges in common-law systems where judicial appointments
are made from practicing lawyers, are not specially trained in sentencing.
In England, many newly appointed High Court judges find that, on
Assize, they are dealing with criminal matters for the first time since
153. June, 1960.
154. See II of this article's text supra.
155. See V(B) of this article's text supra.
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their early days in practice at the bar. The same is true of recorders.
It may well be that a similar problem exists in the United States. In
some jurisdictions, those which deal with the sentencing of juveniles,
special boards are made responsible, but no action along these lines has
been initiated in England. 5 ' It seems, therefore, that we should not
assume that legal qualifications guarantee the necessary comprehension
of penological policy. No doubt, the lawyers who are responsible for
these duties should make themselves qualified. At the level at which
magistrates operate, it may well be that intelligent, devoted citizens
can understand and deal with the problems of the neighborhood as well
as professional lawyers. It should be appreciated that in a Magistrates'
Court a large majority of defendants plead guilty. When the plea is
not guilty, the issue is rarely one of law, and the "jury" aspect and the
((sentencing" aspect of the court's duties are the ones which magistrates
are most commonly called upon to perform.
Provision is made for the appointment, in a borough or a county,
of paid professional magistrates, who may sit in addition to, or instead
of, the amateurs. Such magistrates are known as "stipendiaries," and
less than fifty of them are functioning at the present time. It may be
thought remarkable that the number is so low. One can only conclude
that the boroughs and counties have been satisfied with the services of
the unpaid judges (at least they are not so dissatisfied that they are
prepared to pay for a professional).' 57 The numbers of stipendiary
magistrates will no doubt increase in the years ahead. There is nothing
surprising in that. The remarkable feature of this whole story is that
the lay justices have adapted themselves so successfully to modern con-
ditions; there is something more than the British love of tradition and
continuity in the desire to continue the 600 years of service already
given by this group of citizens.
156. Ingleby Report, 9 155.
157. JACKSON, MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 162-165 (3d ed. 1960); 9 MODERN
L. REv. 1 (1946).
